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Abstract
This paper investigates how the ownership and the procedure for the
selection of ￿rms operating in the local public transport sector a⁄ect their
productivity. In order to compare di⁄erent institutional regimes, we carry
out a comparative analysis of 72 companies operating in large European
cities. This allows us to consider ￿rms selected either through compet-
itive tendering or negotiated procedures. The analysis of the data on
77 European ￿rms over the period 1997-2006 indicates that ￿rms oper-
ate under constant returns to scale. Retrieving the residuals we obtain
a measure of total factor productivity, which we regress on ￿rm and city
characteristics. We ￿nd that when ￿rms are totally or partially in pub-
lic hands their productivity is lower. Moreover, ￿rms selected through
competitive tendering display higher total factor productivity.
Keywords: local public transport; public ownership; translog pro-
duction function
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11 Introduction
This paper focuses on local public transport in Europe in order to address
three main research questions: 1) is competitive tendering able to select more
productive companies?; 2) does public ownership a⁄ect productivity? and 3)
do mixed public-private ￿rms in any way di⁄er from private and public ￿rms as
for productivity?
We claim that the selection mechanism through which di⁄erent cities award
the service is a key aspect that in￿ uences ￿rms￿productivity. Although the
debate on the impact of contractual schemes on productivity is broad, the em-
pirical evidence on the e⁄ects of selection mechanisms on productivity is lagging
behind. Nonetheless, this issue has relevant policy implications: in recent years
the European Commission has promoted a number of reforms in this ￿eld, fa-
vouring competitive procedures over direct negotiation between the city and
the service provider. For example, the implementation of European Directive
1191/69/EU (modi￿ed by 1893/91/EU) has led some member states (France,
Sweden, The Netherlands) to introduce competitive tendering procedures in
the assignment of franchised monopolies in local public transport, thus intro-
ducing some competition "for the market"1. Thus, the local public transport
(LPT henceforth) industry is an interesting case to assess the ability of awarding
mechanisms to select the best ￿rms.
In line with a large body of literature, we also aim at investigating the re-
lationship between ownership and productivity of ￿rms. Indeed, theoretical
predictions on the role of public versus private ownership are not clear-cut, and
the empirical evidence is mixed. We contribute to the literature by examining
￿rms that operate in nine di⁄erent European countries, thus adding a compar-
ative perspective which is lacking in most studies on this industry.
Additionally, we extend our analysis to the study of mixed public-private
￿rms. Although these ￿rms are a common and relevant phenomenon, they have
often been neglected in econometric studies on the LPT industry.
Our data provide answers to our three questions: we observe that ￿rms
which have been awarded the service through a competitive procedure display
higher total factor productivity (TFP). Additionally, we observe that public
1The UK is the sole European country where ￿competition in the market￿has been exper-
ienced in urban transports. In Italy some competitive tendering (for the market) took place
after 1998. However, large cities were not a⁄ected by the tendering process, but for one ￿fth
of the bus services in Rome, since 2001. See Boitani and Cambini (2006), and the references
therein.
2ownership has a signi￿cant and negative impact on ￿rms￿TFP. Finally, we ￿nd
that mixed ￿rms are di⁄erent from entirely private ones, being less productive.
Nonetheless, the di⁄erence between mixed ￿rms and totally public ones is not
always signi￿cant, which suggests that the di⁄erences between these two types
of ￿rms are less clear-cut.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature and
some research hypotheses; section 3 describes the database; section 4 sketches
the empirical model to be tested; section 5 presents the results of our empirical
analysis and, ￿nally, section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
Previous analyses of the LPT industry have focused on the impact of alternative
contract schemes within one country, observing a choice between ￿xed-price
contracts and cost-plus ones and relating it to e¢ ciency. Empirical evidence
con￿rms the theoretical prediction that ￿rms operating under a high-powered
incentive scheme, such as a ￿xed-price contract, are more e¢ cient than ￿rms
operating under a low-powered incentive scheme, such as a cost-plus contract.
Research on this topic relies on information on the type of contract implemented,
which is available only in ad hoc constructed databases. Thus, previous evidence
is country speci￿c: Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (1996, 2003) study the Norwegian
bus industry; Kerstens (1996), Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002), Roy and Yvrande-
Billon (2007), Gautier and Yvrande-Billon (2008) and Gagnepain, Ivaldi and
Martimont (2008) use data on France; Piacenza (2006) and Buzzo Margari,
Erbetta, Petraglia and Piacenza (2007) focus their analyses on Italian LPT
companies.
Our cross-country data set does not allow us to retrieve ￿rm-speci￿c inform-
ation on the type of contract implemented. This prevents us from replicating
the same empirical exercises as those mentioned above. In any case, notice that
a cross-country comparison does not easily lend itself to such a ￿ne analysis.
Comparing di⁄erent contracts, possibly constructing some synthetic indicator
to classify di⁄erent contractual clauses, seems sensible only within a su¢ ciently
uniform institutional setting. Where contracts are su¢ ciently similar, as they
take place within a given legal framework, one can legitimately focus one￿ s at-
tention on speci￿c features. However, contractual arrangements in di⁄erent
countries can be so di⁄erent, to make a quantitative analysis extremely di¢ cult
3to design.
Henceforth, even if such detailed information were available, the possibility of
conducting an appropriate econometric analysis of contracts in a cross-country
perspective would be somehow limited2. On the other hand, our database allows
us to investigate the productivity e⁄ects of two broadly alternative institutional
arrangements in place in di⁄erent European countries. More precisely, we are
able to compare total factor productivity of ￿rms operating under competition
￿for the market￿and ￿rms operating under negotiated procedures.
The label ￿negotiated procedure￿ actually denotes the decision of a local
public administration to directly identify the supplier of the service, possibly
imposing or negotiating some conditions of the service contract. On the other
hand, when there is competition for the market, the service provider is chosen
through public tendering, whereby the ￿rm making the ￿best￿bid is selected.
Which procedure is able to select the most e¢ cient supplier is a widely de-
bated question, at least since Williamson (1976). Recent analyses add further
substance to the debate. In particular, Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2009)
challenge the common wisdom that competition is preferable, showing that ne-
gotiations can indeed perform better than auctions when the object of the con-
tract is complex. Hensher and Stanley (2008) push forward a similar argument
with respect to bus route contracts. Moreover, they complain that the empirical
evidence on the e⁄ects of competitive tendering versus negotiation is lacking in
the local public transport industry. We aim at contributing to ￿ll this gap in
the literature.
The features of the winning bidder will depend on how the tender is organ-
ized, but in some sense the identity of the winner will depend on its e¢ ciency.
If the competitive procedure is properly designed, this will certainly be the case
(Riordan and Sappington, 1987). Analogously, if the local authority were able
to choose by hart the best possible candidate ￿rm and to force the service sup-
plier to be extremely e¢ cient, accepting low prices for ￿nal consumers and/or
low subsidies, the ￿rms selected under negotiated procedures should not be less
e¢ cient than ￿rms selected through competitive tendering.
On the contrary, many observations suggest that local authorities￿direct
choices operate a substantially worse selection of the service provider than com-
petitive procedures do. While we label direct choices of the supplier as ￿nego-
2A study of the e⁄ects of payment structures in the French case can be found in Roy and
Yvrande-Billon (2007). A purely national analysis of that kind is not subject to the above
criticism.
4tiations￿ , several doubts arise on the ability (and e⁄ort) of the public adminis-
trations we consider, to e⁄ectively bargain in order to obtain the best possible
result and to force the supplier to provide the service at the least cost. A reason
for less than e⁄ective bargaining can be that the ￿rm selected under a ￿nego-
tiated￿procedure is normally the long-time incumbent in a city market and is
often owned by the same local authority awarding the licence. In such cases the
￿selected￿￿rm operates under a permanent soft budget constraint. However,
in many European countries negotiated procedures apply also to a number of
private or mixed ￿rms. Hence there is room for competition having a separate
and non-negligible in￿ uence on productivity. On the basis of these arguments,
we aim at testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis1: Firms selected by means of competition ￿for the market￿dis-
play higher total factor productivity than ￿rms operating under negotiated pro-
cedures.
Let us turn to the in￿ uence of ownership on performance. A large body of
literature has focussed on the implications of public versus private ownership,
in LPT as well as in other industries. The theoretical ground for this research
question was laid by Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who show that the choice
the public authority has to face between in-house provision and contracting out
is nontrivial. Indeed, contract incompleteness implies that the private company
has a stronger incentive to engage in cost reduction and a lower incentive in
quality improvement. A state-owned company has stunted incentives both in
cost reduction and in quality improvement. However, as cost reduction may also
reduce quality, private ownership may result in quality (as well as cost) lower
than under public ownership. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) argue that
publicly-owned ￿rms may be forced by politicians to hire an ine¢ ciently high
number of workers, while Krueger (1990) suggests that political connections
would lead to hiring workers with better acquaintances than better skills. On
the other hand, Vickers and Yarrow (1991) argue that agency problems may
arise also in large private corporations, where managers own little of the stock
and are costly to monitor: in this case there is room for diverging objectives
between managers and shareholders.
When moving to the empirical analyses of this issue, the evidence is not
conclusive (See Megginson and Netter, 2001). Notice that authors comparing
the relative ability of competitive mechanisms and privatisation to enhance a
5￿rm￿ s productivity also show mixed results. For instance, considering some
local public services, Domberger, Hall and Li (1995) indicate that competition
is what really matters, while Szymanski (1996) suggests that public ownership
is associated to lower productivity.
Quite naturally, the focus of these empirical analyses has been on those in-
dustries where the share of publicly owned ￿rms is large. Local public transport
is one such industry. Caves and Christensen (1980) provide an early empirical
investigations in this ￿eld. They study Canadian railroads, ￿nding no evidence
of inferior performance by companies owned by the public sector. More re-
cently, Kerstens (1996) ￿nds that private bus operators outperform public ones
in France. Cowie and Asenova (1999) obtain the same result for Great Britain.
Ottoz, Fornengo and Di Giacomo (2008) use a database on Italian ￿rms in the
LPT industry and estimate a translog cost frontier function model attaining
the result that public enterprises are slightly more ine¢ cient that private com-
panies. Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) estimate a translog production frontier
model on a database of French ￿rms operating in LPT observing similar results.
On the other side, Viton (1997) and Odeck and Sunde (2002) ￿nd no signi￿cant
di⁄erence between public and private bus companies in the USA and Norway,
respectively. Filippini and Prioni (2003) estimate a translog cost model for a
sample of private, public and mixed Swiss bus companies and ￿nd ambiguous
results as regards the in￿ uence of ownership on cost-e¢ ciency. Overall, previous
empirical evidence on countries which are included in our sample suggests that
companies owned by the public sector are less productive than private ones.
Therefore, we state our second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Public ownership negatively a⁄ects ￿rms￿ total factor pro-
ductivity.
As for the issue of mixed public-private ￿rms, the literature is scant. Authors
such as Boardman, Eckel and Vining pioneered the research in this area. They
suggest that mixed ownership ￿rms can accomplish pro￿tability and social goals
at a lower cost, thanks to the internal monitoring by private shareholders (Eckel
and Vining, 1985). They state that mixed enterprises perform better that public
ones, but not as well as private ones (Boardman and Vining, 1989). Nonethe-
less, the topic has not been further developed since very recently. Marra (2006)
provides an explanation for the existence of mixed ownership ￿rms. Within a
property rights framework, he argues that mixed ownership allows for a more
6e⁄ective public control that in the case of concessions to private ￿rms, and could
thus be a solution of the opportunistic behaviour entailed by contract incom-
pleteness. Moreover, as the public intervenes as a regulator, mixed ownership
may be a solution to the informational gap between regulator and regulated
enterprises. Although scarce, the theoretical literature suggests a third testable
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Mixed ownership ￿rms di⁄er from entirely public and entirely
private enterprises, showing intermediate levels of total factor productivity.
3 The Data
We test these hypotheses on a database of LPT ￿rms operating across nine
European countries. Data on local public transport seem to be very hard to
￿nd. Empirical studies on LPT generally focus on a single country, or even
a single region at a time. To the best of our knowledge, the sole paper that
investigates the productivity of local public transport companies across di⁄erent
countries in Europe is Wunsch (1996), where labour productivity and average
cost for a cross-section of ￿rms is examined. This calls for some new evidence
across countries. Indeed, in order to inspect whether alternative institutional
regimes have a di⁄erential impact on ￿rm￿ s production choices, we have to
extend our analysis across di⁄erent countries. In order to select the companies
to be included in the analysis, we have followed three criteria.
First, the inclusion in the Amadeus database, maintained by Bureau van
Dijk, which provides balance sheet data over the period 1997-2006. This data-
base imposes some constraints on the dimension of ￿rms. More precisely, for
Germany, France, Italy and Spain, ￿rms have to satisfy at least one of the fol-
lowing criteria: a) operating revenue equal to at least e1.5 million; b) total
assets equal to at least e3 million; c) number of employees equal to at least 20.
For the remaining countries these criteria are relaxed as follows: a) operating
revenue equal to at least e1 million; b) total assets equal to at least e2 million;
c) number of employees equal to at least 15.
Second, we choose to focus on European Countries. Given the time period
considered, we concentrate our analysis on EU 15 countries only. The enlarge-
ment process was undergoing at that time, and large institutional changes where
taking place in transition countries. Thus, for the sake of comparability, we
choose to exclude these countries from our sample. Unfortunately, the Amadeus
7database does not provide information on sales for ￿rms located in the United
Kingdom. This forces us to exclude this country￿ s ￿rms as sales are a necessary
ingredient of our analysis (as will be explained below). However, the prevalence
of competition ￿in the market￿ in UK cities (except London) may well have
introduced a strong country bias in the empirical analysis.
Finally, in order to avoid pooling together widely di⁄erent ￿rms, we choose
to restrict our analysis to ￿rms operating in ￿large￿cities, therefore excluding
from the analysis those ￿rms that operate in small cities, and are consequently
more oriented to extra-urban type of services3. The cities included in our sample
belong to either of the following two sets:
1. cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants;
2. cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants, but with a metropolitan area
with more than 1 million inhabitants.
O¢ cial data on population are sourced from Eurostat. We decide to broaden
the ￿rst criterion by means of the second one in order to include in the analysis
those cities which have relatively ￿small￿administrative borders, but whose
population is still relevant in size. For example, Brussels would be excluded if
considering only the resident population within administrative borders.
Our ￿nal database has information on 77 ￿rms distributed across 9 countries,
as shown in Table 1: our sample includes ￿rms operating in all large EU15 cities,
with the notable exception of Paris. Table 14 in the Appendix reports the list
of cities included in the analysis.
The data we have are budget data for all these companies. Moreover, on the
basis of various sources (web-sites; investigation of national and regional laws;
etc.) we have information on how each service provider was selected (whether or
not on the basis of an explicit competitive procedure). As already mentioned,
we do not have any information on the type on contract each ￿rm has, nor
do we have information on whether (and if yes how) adjustments of the initial
contracts are actually carried out. The absence of this information, however,
does not impair the kind of cross-country analysis we are pursuing.
3Indeed, it has been shown that the network con￿guration, that is to say, the provision of
urban and/or extra-urban transport services, may a⁄ect the cost function of ￿rms (Fraquelli,
Piacenza, Abrate, 2004).
8Table 1: Country breakdown
Country N. of firms Percentage Revenues
AUSTRIA 2 2.60 100,470
BELGIUM 1 1.30 269,781
FRANCE 7 9.09 559,974
GERMANY 23 29.87 1,985,795
ITALY 14 18.18 1,030,517
NETHERLANDS 2 2.60 824,760
PORTUGAL 5 6.49 238,803
SPAIN 19 24.68 1,195,880
SWEDEN 4 5.19 938,587
Total 77 100 1,151,693
Revenues are expressed in thousand Euros. Mean values over
the period 1997-2006
3.1 Description of the Database
In order to estimate a production function, we need a measure of output. As
our ￿rm level data are sourced from balance sheet data, this information is
not directly available.4 However, balance sheet data provide information about
￿sales￿ . This variable includes only the revenue from sales of services, net of
public transfers. As a proxy for price, we retrieve the information on monthly
ticket price for local public transport from the Urban Audit database developed
by Eurostat, and we integrate missing observations by directly looking at com-
panies￿web-sites. Thus, combining the information on sales and an average
price for the transport service, we are able to build a proxy for output. We are
aware that this is a proxy and not a precise measure of output, as it may include
revenues from other activities such as, for instance, the management of public
parkings. Nonetheless, the use of de￿ ated sales as a proxy for output is widely
adopted in the empirical literature.5 A supply-related measure of output, such
4As highlighted in the previous section, some databases with speci￿c information on the
type of contract and output measures are available. Nonetheless, these databases are speci￿c
to a single country, or even a single region.
UITP, the International Association of Public Transport, collects some data on output from
its members, from di⁄erent countries. However, this type of information is not systematically
acquired, thus preventing an econometric exercise on this database.
5As Bartelsman and Doms (2000) point out: ￿The choice of output is often dictated by the
available data. Where possible, physical output with unchanging quality is the best measure.
[...] In general, researchers rely on de￿ating nominal variables at the sectoral level. [...] Using
de￿ated production to measure productivity has one drawback, which is the same whether
applied at the micro level or at the sectoral or aggregate level: Any quality improvement in
output that is not re￿ected in the de￿ator will result in a downward bias in productivity￿.
9as vehicle-kilometers or yearly seat-kilometers would be preferable but, unfor-
tunately, it has not been possible to retrieve this information for a su¢ cient
number of companies across countries.
As input variables in our production function we have capital (de￿ned as
tangible ￿xed assets); labour, expressed as the number of employees; and the
cost of material inputs. Nominal variables are all de￿ ated by the country-speci￿c
consumer price index for transport services, which is sourced from Eurostat.
Table 2 reports some summary statistics about the ￿rms included in the analysis.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, total sample
Total sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Capital 282,715.9 666,319.0 1,249.0 4,545,975.0
N. of employees 2,478.5 2,648.2 95.0 14,888.0
Cost of employees 99,561.1 120,090.7 2,589.0 843,456.0
Operating revenues 169,151.3 210,875.8 7,838.0 1,245,326.0
Value Added 116,742.5 163,328.1 3,077.0 1,187,732.0
Sales 123,610.6 160,935.2 8,972.0 948,124.0
K/L 131.9 568.5 2.9 10,010.5
VA/L 93.9 680.7 24.6 12,222.3
REVENUES/L 178.6 1,031.0 39.3 18,217.3
Unit lab. Cost 45.0 102.7 25.2 2,090.7
Capital, total cost of employees, operating revenues, value added and sales
are expressed in thousand Euros. K/L is the ratio of capital over total
number of employess. VA/L is the ratio of value added over total number
of employees. REVENUE/L is operating revenues over total number of
employees. Unit labour cost is the ratio of total cost of employees over
total number of employees. Mean values over the period 1997-2006
Local public transport companies o⁄er various types of services, which are
produced using di⁄erent technologies. The main di⁄erence lies in the provi-
sion of metro services versus ground transportation services (tram, bus and
light rail), since infrastructure costs and technologies are widely di⁄erent. We
have obtained from companies￿web-sites the information on the type of service
provided, and whether the ￿rms operated also extra-urban transportation ser-
vices. Table 3 shows that ￿rms operating underground transportation services
are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from ￿rms operating other types of ground trans-
portation: they are larger, both in terms of capital and number of employees.
Moreover, they have larger revenues, value added and sales. The test on the
Notice however that the issue of quality measurement is problematic also when direct measures
of output are available.
10equality of means strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the two types of
￿rms present the same mean values for most of these variables. This suggests
to distinguish these ￿rms from the whole sample in the subsequent analysis.
Table 16 in the Appendix reports the full set of descriptive statistics for the two
subsamples.








Capital 812,674.3 98,889.2 -10.891 (0.000)***
N. of employees 4,053.1 1,814.1 -7.896 (0.000)***
Cost of employees 181,253.8 68,399.4 -9.016 (0.000)***
Operating revenues 308,274.2 117,195.5 -8.642 (0.000)***
Value Added 274,889.6 77,704.7 -9.600 (0.000)***
Sales 205,547.0 89,631.5 -6.695 (0.000)***
K/L 227.6 90.0 -2.201 (0.028)**
VA/L 53.6 91.9 0.414 (0.680)
REVENUES/L 130.2 172.9 0.378 (0.706)
Unit lab. Cost 64.0 36.9 -2.385 ( 0.018)**
Capital, total cost of employees, operating revenues, value added and sales are
expressed in thousand Euros. K/L is the ratio of capital over total number of
employess. VA/L is the ratio of value added over total number of employees.
REVENUE/L is operating revenues over total number of employees. Unit
labour cost is the ratio of total cost of employees over total number of
employees.
One of the aims of this paper is to shed light on the impact of competition for
the market on ￿rm￿ s performance. In this perspective, countries can be divided
into two groups: countries where LPT services are tendered out (France, Neth-
erlands and Sweden) and countries where LPT companies are selected through
negotiated procedures (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain).6 In
the period considered, no change from negotiated procedures to competition for
the market or vice-versa was detected for the ￿rms in the sample.
We are clearly aware that some aspects of the tendering procedures may dif-
fer widely from case to case, and that competitive or collusive outcomes may de-
pend on crucial details of the procedures. The French Competition Commission,
for instance, denounced in 2005 the existence of a cartel between three leading
operators, who were alleged of coordinating their bidding strategies, leading ￿the
6Although Law decree 422/1997 has introduced competitive tendering in Italy, the Italian
￿rms included in the database were all operating under negotiated procedures during the time
period considered in the analysis.
11companies to impose their prices to local authorities who consequently have had
to bear higher charges than those which would have resulted from a competit-
ive functioning of the market￿(Yvrande-Billon, 2006, p. 470). It is precisely
because of the potential di⁄erences in the e⁄ectiveness of competition for the
market in di⁄erent countries that our cross-country analysis may have some
value added. Analogously, ￿negotiated￿procedures may di⁄er widely in their
incentive power. In some cases the local administration may engage in tough
negotiations with the ￿rm in order to extract the highest possible rent, may
credibly state its unwilligness to enter re-contracting and/or may set clear-cut
bail-out clauses. In some other cases re-contracting and bail-out are perceived
by the ￿rm as without limits. Again, a cross country perspective is useful to
average out possible country-speci￿c biases.
A simple analysis on the equality of means shows that ￿rms operating under
the two alternative institutional regimes are indeed di⁄erent. Table 4 shows the
results. When testing the equality of means on the overall sample, di⁄erences
are limited. Nonetheless, when we concentrate on the sample of ￿rms operating
ground transportation services only, we ￿nd that institutional settings make a
di⁄erence. Firms operating under negotiated procedure are generally smaller,
both in terms of capital and labour, and in terms of revenues, valued added and
sales. Table 17 in the Appendix shows some descriptive statistics by country.
As for the type of ownership, information was retrieved from the Amadeus
database, with a cross-check on ￿rms￿web sites. Indeed, as stated in Hypothesis
2, we expect that a public owner may be di⁄erent from a private one in terms
of TFP.
Additionally, we observe that a third type of ￿rms exists: those whose own-
ership is partly public, and partly private. Such mixed ￿rms represent a relevant
share of the sample, as shown in Table 5. In our sample, about 20% of the total
number of ￿rms have a mixed ownership, totally private ones are around 17%,
while totally public ￿rms are predominant, and represent 63% of our observa-
tions. In mixed ￿rms, the public shareholder is typically in control, as its share
never falls below 33.3 %. In many cases (about one half of the ￿rms), private
ownership remains below 15%, so that the di⁄erence between these ￿rms and
totally public ones may be considered dubious.
Disentangling the data by the type of transport service provided, we observe
that mixed and private ownership types are equally represented in ground trans-
portation services, while totally private ￿rms are almost absent in the sample of
companies providing metro services, which is the stronghold of publicly owned
12Table 4: Descriptive statistics according to institutional environment








Capital 141,874.1 282,650.5 1.742 (0.082)*
N. of employees 2,867.1 2,198.3 -2.021 (0.044)**
Cost of employees 106,147.6 91,088.8 -1.005 (0.316)
Operating revenues 202,862.8 151,032.1 -1.977 (0.049)**
Value Added 128,328.9 104,388.9 -1.135 (0.257 )
Sales 175,699.9 102,979.2 -3.691 (0.000)***
K/L 63.8 132.7 0.997 (0.319)
VA/L 43.1 96.3 0.626 (0.532)
REVENUES/L 249.6 145.0 -0.846 (0.398)
Unit lab. Cost 35.3 44.7 0.744 (0.458)








Capital 156,910.1 84,276.5 -3.816 (0.000)***
N. of employees 2,748.7 1,577.0 -4.090 (0.000)***
Cost of employees 103,332.5 59,633.9 -3.902 (0.000)***
Operating revenues 199,479.8 96,548.6 -5.121 (0.000)***
Value Added 128,433.3 63,754.4 -4.720 (0.000)***
Sales 169,709.7 69,538.1 -5.368 (0.000)***
K/L 70.9 94.7 0.316 (0.752)
VA/L 44.0 105.1 0.623 (0.534)
REVENUES/L 272.0 147.8 -0.841 (0.401)
Unit lab. Cost 35.6 37.3 1.117 (0.265)
Capital, total cost of employees, operating revenues, value added and sales are expressed
in thousand Euros. K/L is the ratio of capital over total number of employess. VA/L is
the ratio of value added over total number of employees. REVENUE/L is operating
revenues over total number of employees. Unit labour cost is the ratio of total cost of
employees over total number of employees.
￿rms. Two thirds of mixed ownership ￿rms in the database operate under ne-
gotiated procedure. Table 15 shows the share of ￿rms according to ownership
type by country.
Analogously to what we observed about the diversity of arrangements for
awarding the service, even the actual content of public shareholding may vary
substantially from country to country. In some countries, political interference is
heavy and di⁄used, while elsewhere managers￿ autonomy may be deeply rooted.
In the same way, elements such as di⁄erent legal traditions, di⁄erent budget con-
straints of local authorities and the governance structure of local public ￿rms are
probably relevant elements, which may di⁄er substantially across countries. As
argued above, it is exactly because of these institutional and political di⁄erences
that our cross-country analysis may have a particular value added.
13Table 5: Descriptive statistics: type of ownership




Public 57.67 5.72 63.39
Mixed own. 12.59 6.64 19.22
Private 12.36 5.03 17.39
Total 82.61 17.39 100
Number of Obs. 437




Public 50.15 7.37 57.52
Mixed own. 13.86 6.49 20.35
Private 15.93 6.19 22.12
Total 79.94 20.06 100





Public 83.67 0.00 83.67
Mixed own. 8.16 7.14 15.31
Private 0.00 1.02 1.02
Total 91.84 8.16 100
Number of Obs. 98
Relative frequencies are reported.
4 The Empirical Model
In order to estimate ￿rms￿productivities, several modeling alternatives have
been used in the literature. Some authors follow a one-step procedure, and
estimate either a translog production function or a cost function including into
the estimating equation some controls for ownership or contractual agreements
(see, among others, Filippini and Prioni, 2003). Although widely adopted, this
methodology seems to rely too much on the inevitably arbitrary choice of the
additional variables to be included in the econometric speci￿cation. Moreover,
in this case estimates would be a⁄ected by availability of data on the control
variables.
Another widely adopted approach is the estimation of a stochastic produc-
tion frontier model (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977). In the standard pooled
speci￿cation, the mean of the ine¢ ciency term is assumed to be a⁄ected by
14a number of characteristics of interest (see, among others, Roy and Yvrande-
Billon, 2007). Again, a pooled speci￿cation would imply loosing the additional
information that can be extracted from the panel structure of our data. Altern-
atively, one could parameterize the ine¢ ciency term either with a time-invariant
model or with the Battese-Coelli (1992) parametrization of time e⁄ects. The
shortcoming of these two speci￿cations is that they do not allow one to model
the mean of the ine¢ ciency term as a function of a set of covariates, such as
ownership and institutional framework. This would hamper us from testing our
research hypotheses.
To avoid these problems, we prefer to estimate the translog production func-
tion with ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects7. Since our controls in the second step are essentially
time invariant ￿rm characteristics, the two-stages option is preferable. Indeed,
in this way the production function estimation takes into account all time-
invariant ￿rm characteristics, without incurring problems of data availability.
Additionally, a ￿xed e⁄ect estimator has the advantage of providing an an-
swer to the problem of endogeneity of inputs choices. Notice that the error term
in the production function can be decomposed into two terms: "it = !it + ￿it,
where !it represents unobservables that are unknown to the econometrician,
but are observed (or predictable) by ￿rms when choosing inputs, and ￿it repres-
ents unobservables that are not observed by the ￿rm before input decision. For
example, !it could represent managerial ability, or expected down-time due to
vehicles breakdowns, while ￿it could represent deviations from expected break-
downs. Since a ￿rm has knowledge of its !it when making input choices, these
choices will be correlated with !it, thus incurring endogeneity. A possible an-
swer to this problem is the estimation by ￿xed e⁄ects. Although this estimator
assumes that unobserved productivity !it is constant over time, it allows one
to consistently estimate the production function. Given the short time period
we consider, we believe that constancy of !it is not a strong assumption.
Thus, we choose the following research strategy. As a ￿rst step, we estimate a
production function. We will then retrieve the residuals of this estimation and
regress them on ownership and competition variables as well as ￿rm speci￿c
variables. This two-step procedure is widely used and acknowledged in the
literature (see e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004).
For the production function, we adopt a ￿ exible functional form, which al-
lows us to take into account second-order e⁄ects. More precisely, we adopt a
7As will be evident in the next section, this speci￿cation is supported also by our data.
15translog model (Berndt and Christensen, 1973), which can be interpreted as a
second-order approximation to an unknown functional form, and therefore al-
lows for a large degree of ￿ exibility. We estimate a translog production function
with three inputs: capital (Kit), labour (Lit) and materials (Mit).
lnYit = ￿L lnLit + ￿K lnKit + ￿M lnMit + (1)
+￿L;L lnLit ￿ lnLit + ￿L;K lnLit ￿ lnKit +
+￿L;M lnLit ￿ lnMit + ￿K;K lnKit ￿ lnKit +
+￿K;M lnKit ￿ lnMit + ￿M;M lnMit ￿ lnMit + ￿i + "it
This speci￿cation allows us to estimate input elasticities and returns to scale.
Moreover, ￿i is a set of dummy variables aimed at capturing the unobservable
￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects, while "it represents the Hicksian neutral productivity level of
￿rm i.
As for the second step, we retrieve ￿rms￿total factor productivity, which is
the di⁄erence between the actual and predicted output, as the residual of the
estimated production function. Once obtained an index of TFP from the resid-
ual of equation (1), we are able to investigate which factors a⁄ect it. Therefore,
as a second step of our empirical analysis, we regress this index of TFP on a set
of ￿rm, city and country characteristics. We estimate the following equation:
lnTFPit = ￿ + ￿firm_characteristicsit + ￿procedurect + (2)
+￿ownershipit + ’city_characteristicsrt + &it
where firm_characteristics is a vector of ￿rm speci￿c characteristics such
as being part of a group and type of transport service provided. The dummy
variable procedure de￿nes the type of awarding procedure under which ￿rms op-
erate, whether competitive tendering or negotiated procedure. The ownership
dummy variables de￿ne the type of owners, either totally public, totally private
or mixed ownership. Finally, city_characteristics is a vector including some
features of the cities in which ￿rms operate, such as population density and
GDP per capita. These city characteristics may indeed a⁄ect performance: for
instance, higher density may imply higher tra¢ c congestion resulting in lower
speed of buses and trams, whilst higher GDP per capita may imply higher real
16wages and di⁄erent attitudes towards the choice on public or private means of
transport.
Finally, notice that the interpretation of coe¢ cients is substantially di⁄erent
in a one-step procedure or in a two-step. Indeed, in the ￿rst case the estimated
coe¢ cients state how a variable a⁄ects the quantity of output produced, for a
given level of inputs. In the second, the estimated coe¢ cients directly suggest
how speci￿c factors a⁄ect ￿rms￿productivity. Given the aim of our analysis,
namely to investigate how selection mechanisms and ownership a⁄ect the pro-
ductivity of ￿rms, the two-step procedure yields a set of coe¢ cients which can
be directly interpreted.
Take for example the role of selection mechanisms: no economic a priori
suggests that the amount of output should be statistically di⁄erent between
￿rms selected by means of a public tendering or negotiated procedures. Indeed,
the correlation between the output variable and the procedure variable is 0.06
and not statistically signi￿cant. However, economic theory suggests that ￿rms
selected through a competitive tendering should be more productive, and this
is con￿rmed by a correlation of 0.11, signi￿cant at 5% level, between the output
variable and the dummy for competitive tendering.
Although the two speci￿cations yield the same information, we choose the
two-step procedure as it is preferable in terms of readability of the results.
5 Results
5.1 Production Function and Returns to Scale Estimation
The ￿rst step of our empirical analysis consists in the estimation of the translog
production function (1) where, as said, Yit is the index of output, Lit is employ-
ment, Kit are tangible ￿xed assets and Mit are costs for material inputs. All
monetary variables have been de￿ ated by a country-speci￿c industry de￿ ator.
All variables are expressed in logarithms. As speci￿ed above, although we will
later show that our results do not change drastically under di⁄erent assump-
tions, total factor productivity is de￿ned as the error term of this regression.
Table 6 presents the results, obtained through di⁄erent methods.
We ￿rst estimate equation (1) by pooling our observations together, using
ordinary least squares (see column (1) in Table 6). We test the null hypothesis
that all interaction terms are equal to zero, which is strongly rejected: this
suggests that indeed a translog production function is to be preferred to a Cobb-




lnLit -0.579*** -0.0504 -0.375*
(0.204) (0.244) (0.216)
lnKit 0.344** -0.0513 -0.0837
(0.175) (0.223) (0.193)
lnMit 0.282* 1.509*** 1.132***
(0.167) (0.220) (0.195)
lnLit*lnLit 0.0702*** 0.0781*** 0.0546***
(0.0177) (0.0228) (0.0194)
lnLit*lnKit -0.0310 -0.127*** -0.0936***
(0.0194) (0.0281) (0.0237)
lnLit*lnMit 0.0624*** 0.0652** 0.0907***
(0.0213) (0.0258) (0.0218)
lnKit*lnKit 0.0203** 0.0441** 0.0405***
(0.00957) (0.0175) (0.0141)
lnKit*lnMit -0.0672*** 0.0243 -0.00305
(0.0165) (0.0227) (0.0192)
lnMit*lnMit 0.0161 -0.0953*** -0.0702***
(0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0135)
Constant 2.779*** -3.467*** 0.604
(0.647) (1.137) (0.914)













 F(6,427) = 8.87 *** F( 6,351) = 16.05***  X
2(6) = 85.22***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Test on effects F(76,351) = 26.66***   X
2(1) =220.80***
(0.000) (0.000)
Hausman test   X
2(9) =71.35***
(0.000)
Dependent variable: lnYit is the log of index of output. lnLit is the log of number of employees,
lnKit is the log of deflated capital, lnMit is the log of deflated material costs. Column (1)
reports pooled estimation (OLS); column (2) a model with firm-specific fixed effects and
column (3) a model with firm-specific random effects. Test on interaction terms tests the null
hypothesis that all interaction terms are statistically equal to zero. Test on effects provides an
F test that all fixed effects are equal to zero in column (2), and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian
multiplier test for random effects in column (3). Standard error in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Douglas one.
Nonetheless, as we use panel data, it is well known that pooling observations
together could distort the results, as observations of the same ￿rm at di⁄erent
times are counted as totally independent. This is clearly a strong assumption,
since we are neglecting that some ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics may in￿ uence a
￿rm￿ s production function. In order to include them into the analysis, we es-
timate a model with ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects (see column (2)). Again, the test on
interaction terms suggests that the translog speci￿cation is appropriate. Ad-
ditionally, a test on the signi￿cance of ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects suggests that
these are strongly signi￿cant. Therefore, the inclusion of a set of dummies for
18￿rm speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects improves the estimation.
An alternative technique would be to include random e⁄ects. This possibil-
ity is presented in column (3) in Table 6. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian
multiplier test for random e⁄ects suggests that these are again signi￿cant. How-
ever, a random e⁄ects model assumes that the correlation between explanatory
variables and ￿rm e⁄ects is 0. This is quite a strong assumption, as we would
expect ￿rm speci￿c e⁄ects to be correlated with factor endowments. In fact,
computing the correlation coe¢ cient between random e⁄ects and explanatory
variables we ￿nd that it is equal to ￿0:208 and is statistically signi￿cant at
1%. In order to choose between the two alternative speci￿cations, we adopt
an Hausman test8 (see the bottom line in Table 6). The test suggests that a
￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation should be adopted. Therefore, we choose this as our
preferred speci￿cation.
As a robustness check, we repeat our exercise on the subsample that includes
￿rms operating ground transportation only.9 We have seen indeed that ￿rms
operating underground transportation services are di⁄erent from ground trans-
portation ￿rms in terms of capital, employees, and sales. Table 7 presents the
result for the production function estimations on this subsample, comparing the
same methodologies considered in Table 6. Again, the ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation
(in column (2)) is supported by the data, both against OLS (￿xed e⁄ects are
highly signi￿cant) and random e⁄ects (as suggested by the Hausman test).
To interpret the estimated ￿rst-order parameters we calculate the elasticities
of output to inputs at di⁄erent values of inputs distributions: namely mean, ￿rst,
second and third quartiles. Results are presented in Table 8. We get signi￿cant
coe¢ cient estimates for the three inputs included in the production function.
Moreover, we obtain constant returns to scale. We test the signi￿cance of this
result: our null hypothesis is H0 : "L + "K + "M = 1, which, as shown in
the bottom line of Table 8, is never rejected. Interestingly, we ￿nd that the
estimated returns to scale are decreasing in the size of the ￿rms. This result
is coherent with other ￿ndings in the literature, see for example Cambini and
8Hausman (1978) test provides a test for orthogonality of the random e⁄ects and the re-
gressors. The test is based on the di⁄erence between RE and FE estimates. FE is consistent
when the explanatory variable and the individual e⁄ects are correlated, while RE is inconsist-
ent. Thus a statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence is interpreted as evidence against RE.
9We classify as ￿metro companies￿ those ￿rms which o⁄er underground transportation
services. These ￿rms may be o⁄ering exclusively undergound transportation services, or both
ground and underground transportation services.




lnLit -1.121*** -0.365 -1.098***
(0.157) (0.287) (0.199)
lnKit -0.260 -0.112 -0.143
(0.164) (0.217) (0.176)
lnMit 2.169*** 1.720*** 2.018***
(0.175) (0.221) (0.180)
lnLit*lnLit 0.145*** 0.0988*** 0.137***
(0.0144) (0.0247) (0.0174)
lnLit*lnKit -0.0215 -0.118*** -0.0477**
(0.0156) (0.0278) (0.0203)
lnLit*lnMit 0.00477 0.0690*** 0.0275
(0.0191) (0.0251) (0.0200)
lnKit*lnKit -0.00337 0.0545*** 0.00720
(0.0102) (0.0178) (0.0142)
lnKit*lnMit 0.0355* 0.00536 0.0340*
(0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0199)
lnMit*lnMit -0.116*** -0.104*** -0.117***
(0.0144) (0.0141) (0.0127)
Constant -1.246** -3.180*** -1.307*
(0.579) (1.071) (0.782)













 F(6,329) = 34.98***  F(6,272) = 20.54***  X
2(6) = 180.55***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Test on effects F(57,272) = 14.82***   X
2(1) = 306.93***
(0.000) (0.000)
Hausman test    X
2(9) = 42.15***
(0.000)
Dependent variable: lnYit is the log of index of output. lnLit is the log of number of
employees, lnKit is the log of deflated capital, lnMit is the log of deflated material costs.
Model with firm-specific fixed effects. Test on interaction terms tests the null hypothesis that
all interaction terms are statistically equal to zero. Test on effects provides an F test that all
fixed effects are equal to zero. Standard error in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Filippini (2003) and Di Giacomo and Ottoz (2007).
It has to be noted that the literature frequently ￿nds increasing returns to
scale: however, these results are generally obtained on samples of small and
medium-sized companies (See Cambini, Piacenza, Vannoni, 2007 for a compre-
hensive review of previous empirical evidence on scale and density economies
in LPT). Evidence on large urban companies is scant. Matas and Raymond
(1998) study 9 large urban bus companies in Spain, ￿nding a U-shaped aver-
age cost curve. However, in the long run their results do not di⁄er appreciably
from constant returns to scale, with slight diseconomies for larger companies.
Jha and Singh (2001) obtain the same result studying the cost structure of 9
large Indian bus companies. Overall, these articles suggest that scale econom-
20Table 8: Elasticities of output to inputs and returns to scale
Total sample
First Quartile Median Third Quartile Mean
Labour 0.339 0.372 0.288 0.327
(0.076)*** (0.099)*** (0.122)*** (0.090)***
Capital 0.143 0.178 0.289 0.201
(0.055)*** (0.074)** (0.112)*** (0.074)***
Material inputs 0.563 0.448 0.358 0.466
(0.053)*** (0.072)*** (0.098)*** (0.070)***
Returns to scale 1.045 0.998 0.934 0.994
(0.093)*** (0.116)*** (0.150)*** (0.111)***
Test on constant
returns to scale 0.045 -0.002 -0.066 -0.006
(0.093) (0.116) (0.150) (0.111)
Elasticities of output to inputs are calculated at the sample means, first, second
and third quartiles values for inputs. Returns to scale are obtained as the sum of
input elasticities. The test on constant returns to scale tests the null hypothesis that
there are constant returns to scale. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
ies are exhausted for larger companies. More recently, Cambini, Piacenza and
Vannoni (2007) obtain the opposite result: using a sample of 31 medium and
large-sized Italian companies, they ￿nd both economies of scale, and economies
of density. Our sample includes large companies, and results presented in Table
8 seem to be in line with ￿ndings by Matas and Raymond (1998) and Jha and
Singh (2001). Testing for the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale, we
observe that although estimated returns to scale are decreasing across quartiles,
this trend is not signi￿cant: at di⁄erent values of size for inputs the estimated
returns are never signi￿cantly di⁄erent from one.
Table 9 presents the estimated elasticities of output to inputs, computed
for di⁄erent values of the inputs in the subsample of ￿rms operating ground
transportation only. The ￿nding of constant returns to scale is con￿rmed also
in this subsample of ￿rms which are, on average, smaller than those operating
also (or only) underground services. Point estimates of returns to scale are
larger in size relative to the estimates obtained in the full sample.
21Table 9: Elasticities of output to inputs and returns to scale, ground transport-
ation companies only
Ground transportation
First Quartile Median Third Quartile Mean
Labour 0.438 0.468 0.477 0.440
(0.079)*** (0.108)*** (0.132)*** (0.094)***
Capital 0.141 0.206 0.311 0.220
(0.049)*** (0.069)*** (0.098)*** (0.066)***
Material inputs 0.481 0.400 0.204 0.361
(0.051)*** (0.067)*** (0.094)** (0.068)***
Returns to scale 1.061 1.074 0.991 1.021
(0.087)*** (0.109)*** (0.135)*** (0.101)***
Test on constant
returns to scale
0.061 0.074 -0.009 0.021
(0.087) (0.109) (0.135) (0.101)
Elasticities of output to inputs are calculated at the sample means, first, second
and third quartiles values for inputs. Returns to scale are obtained as the sum of
input elasticities. The test on constant returns to scale tests the null hypothesis that
there are constant returns to scale. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
5.2 Determinants of TFP: the Role of Ownership and
Competition
We recover our measure of total factor productivity as the di⁄erence between
actual and predicted output in the estimation of the translog ￿xed e⁄ects pro-
duction function (equation (1)). This allows us to estimate equation (2): we
regress the index of TFP obtained from the estimation of equation (1) on a
number of ￿rm and city characteristics which could in￿ uence ￿rms￿productiv-
ity.
In particular, besides our ownership and competition variables, we consider
a number of control variables. We control for the ￿rm￿ s structure, in terms of
activities carried out (e.g., underground transportation, extra-urban services)
and its management (being part of a larger group or not). Additionally, we
include a control for city features (income, size, density and so on). Table 10
presents the results.
Notice that as the coe¢ cients reported are standardized, a comparison between
the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is possible. The results in column (1) report
a basic regression of our measure of TFP on a set of ￿rm￿ s characteristics. As
expected, the type of transport service provided in￿ uences productivity. The
results simply indicate that having ￿xed structures such as those of companies
owning underground (Metro) or surface (Tram) networks, decreases estimated
22Table 10: Total factor productivity estimation
Total sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Metro -0.121*** -0.0810** -0.102** -0.0729* -0.115**
(-3.253) (-2.090) (-2.514) (-1.760) (-2.550)
Metro services 0.257** 0.272*** 0.231** 0.247** 0.212**
(2.530) (2.677) (2.139) (2.303) (2.068)
Tram -0.290*** -0.336*** -0.239*** -0.284*** -0.234***
(-7.876) (-8.608) (-6.619) (-7.541) (-6.704)
Bus -0.109 -0.113 -0.153* -0.150* -0.248***
(-1.275) (-1.331) (-1.814) (-1.804) (-2.638)
Extra-urban services -0.0361 -0.00661 -0.0740** -0.0409 -0.00673
(-0.989) (-0.179) (-2.175) (-1.175) (-0.172)
Group member 0.0973** 0.0332 0.0224 -0.0331 -0.0203
(2.072) (0.684) (0.460) (-0.678) (-0.437)
Competition 0.183*** 0.176*** 0.176***
(3.630) (3.707) (3.561)
Mixed own. -0.0175 -0.0128 -0.0281
(-0.426) (-0.335) (-0.714)
Mainly public mixed own. -0.182*** -0.196*** -0.212***
(-5.117) (-5.741) (-6.183)
Fully public own. -0.237*** -0.204*** -0.216***
(-4.169) (-3.913) (-4.357)
City population density 0.0206
(0.444)
Observations 434 434 434 434 427
R-squared 0.242 0.266 0.279 0.300 0.323
Test on equality between mixed







Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Test on equality between mixed







Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Test on equality between mainly








Prob > F (0.071) (0.002) (0.002)
Dependent variable: TFPit is the log of Total Factor Productivity, obtained as a residual from the
production function estimation. OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Standardized 'beta'
coefficients are reported. t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
productivity. Moreover, tramways may not accommodate the number of pas-
sengers that compensates the higher ￿xed cost entailed by this technology. In-
stead, ￿rms which operate underground services, without owning the network,
display higher TFP; this is hardly surprising, in that these companies do the
same service as those captured by the dummy "Metro", without the ￿xed input
represented by the network. Additionally, we ￿nd that (arguably more labour
intensive) ground transportation services negatively a⁄ect ￿rm￿ s productivity.
Moreover, the provision of extra-urban services seems to negatively a⁄ect pro-
ductivity, although this result is not signi￿cant. Finally, it turns out that a
￿rm being part of a large (sometimes multinational) group is likely to be more
23productive than a stand-alone ￿rm. This could be due to better managerial
practices which are shared among members of the same group.
In column (2) we add a control for the type of institutional (i.e. regulatory)
regime. As expected, competitive tendering has a positive e⁄ect on total factor
productivity: the coe¢ cient attached to the variable is always positive and sig-
ni￿cant at 1% level. This result provides empirical support to our ￿rst research
hypothesis, namely that a competitive setting may enhance ￿rms￿TFP. Then,
we control the e⁄ect of the type of ownership in column (3).
It can be seen that public ownership negatively a⁄ects TFP, and the same
holds true for mixed ownership. Notice that in this speci￿cation we distinguish
two types of mixed ownership companies: those in which the public share is
predominant (more than 85%), which we label "Mainly public", and those in
which the private and public share are more balanced. We suspect that such
a relevant public share may imply a management style which is di⁄erent from
the one in mixed ownership companies, being, if any, closer to the full public
ownership type. Thus, we label these companies as "almost" public and in this
￿rst estimate we consider them as a separate category.10
These categories of ownership have a negative impact on TFP with compar-
ison to the benchmark, which is the omitted category: privately owned ￿rms.
Thus, we can say that Hypothesis 2 is supported by our data. Our result is in
line with Gautier and Yvrande-Billon (2008), who ￿nd that mixed ownership
French LPT ￿rms have a lower e¢ ciency level than private ones, irrespective of
the type of contract under which they operate. As the coe¢ cients are stand-
ardized, we are able to compare their magnitudes, and to establish a ranking in
terms of productivity. The fully public ￿rms are the least productive, followed
by the mainly public (public share over 85%). The ￿rms where the public share
is below 85% are more productive, and they are not statistically di⁄erent from
the private ones.
Moreover, the table reports the test on the equality of coe¢ cients between
fully public ownership, mostly public ownership, and mixed ownership. The
test suggests that the di⁄erence in terms of TFP between the three types of
￿rms is statistically signi￿cant, thus supporting the distinction of ￿rms into
these categories. Therefore, we ￿nd partial evidence in favour of our third
hypothesis: mainly public mixed ownership ￿rms di⁄er from private companies,
being signi￿cantly less productive. Nonetheless, the di⁄erence in terms of total
10See Section 5.3 for an extensive discussion on the role of ownership and for alternative
de￿nitions of the explanatory variables.
24factor productivity between "truly" mixed and privately owned companies is
not signi￿cant. Thus, we may state that mixed ownership companies are not
a homogeneous category, and di⁄erent groups of mixed ￿rms are statistically
di⁄erent in terms of productivity.
Columns (2) to (4) jointly show that regulatory environment and owner-
ship independently a⁄ect ￿rm￿ s total factor productivity: These variables are
signi￿cant both if considered alone, as in the second and third column, and in
combination, as in the fourth column. As seen in Table 5, many ￿rms in our
sample are in public hands and operating under negotiated procedures. One
may wonder whether this "in house" providing is the key factor, rather than
ownership and awarding procedures independently. As a robustness check, we
include the interaction term between selection mechanism and public ownership
in the speci￿cation presented in column (4). This term is not signi￿cant, while
the other variables keep the same signs and signi￿cance levels. This clearly in-
dicates that being a totally public ￿rm, selected through negotiated procedure,
does not have any additional e⁄ect on ￿rm￿ s TFP once public ownership and
selection mechanism are controlled for11.
Finally, thanks to the Urban Audit Database by Eurostat, we are able to
include some information on some of the cities where ￿rms operate, such as
city size (both area and population), demographic indicators, income, mobility
indicators (Proportion of journeys to work by car, Number of registered cars
per 1000 inhabitants, etc.) and indicators of the relevance of touristic activities
in the city. Although we cannot report all results, only few of these variables
a⁄ect our estimates, and they never change the sign and signi￿cance of other
coe¢ cients. The results in column (5) show that population density does not
in￿ uence ￿rms￿productivity in the full sample of the ￿rms we consider.12
Table 11 presents the results on the factors a⁄ecting total productivity ob-
tained on the subsample of ￿rms that operate only ground transportation ser-
vices. Provision of extra urban services is still not signi￿cant13. Again, being
part of a larger group positively a⁄ects productivity. This result is more robust
in the subsample of ground transportation companies.
Firms selected through competition ￿for the market￿display higher levels
11Results are available upon request.
12We also included city area expressed in Km2 as a control for the network size, generally
obtaining a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient.
13Indeed, the evidence on the presence of economies of scope between urban and intercity
services is mixed. While Di Giacomo and Ottoz (2007) ￿nd some evidence of diseconomies
of scope, Fraquelli, Piacenza and Abrate (2004) ￿nd economies of scope. Both papers use a
sample of ￿rms that excludes metro companies.
25Table 11: Total factor productivity estimation, ground transportation compan-
ies only
Ground transportation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tram -0.368*** -0.422*** -0.287*** -0.330*** -0.416***
(-8.104) (-9.154) (-6.733) (-7.413) (-9.243)
Bus 0.329*** 0.315*** 0.278*** 0.272*** 0.221***
(8.021) (7.582) (7.073) (6.825) (3.781)
Extra-urban services 0.0234 0.0514 -0.0557 -0.0274 0.0121
(0.503) (1.099) (-1.347) (-0.656) (0.295)
Group member 0.227*** 0.182*** 0.0956** 0.0643 0.0478
(6.693) (5.639) (2.106) (1.572) (1.503)
Competition 0.192*** 0.157** 0.130**
(2.856) (2.564) (2.300)
Mixed own. -0.476*** -0.444*** -0.448***
(-8.501) (-9.017) (-8.890)
Mainly public mixed own. -0.0785* -0.0691* 0.0207
(-1.673) (-1.673) (0.523)
Fully public own. -0.358*** -0.367*** -0.405***
(-7.772) (-8.241) (-8.856)
City population density -0.263***
(-5.388)
Observations 336 336 336 336 329
R-squared 0.299 0.329 0.451 0.470 0.504
Test on equality between mixed







Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Test on equality between mixed







Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Test on equality between mainly








Prob > F (0.165) (0.034) (0.003)
Dependent variable: TFPit is the log of Total Factor Productivity, obtained as a residual from the
production function estimation. OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Standardized 'beta'
coefficients are reported. t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
of TFP. However, this result is slightly less robust across speci￿cations in this
subsample. As for the type of ownership, the result that public ￿rms are less
productive is con￿rmed. Again, mixed ownership ￿rms are less productive than
private ones, although the ranking in terms of productivity is changed. The
di⁄erence between fully public ￿rms, mainly public, and mixed ownership ones
is generally statistically signi￿cant in the subsample of ￿rms o⁄ering ground
transportation services only. Finally, controls for city characteristics suggest
that population density now has a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient, thus
suggesting the presence of negative congestion externalities that a⁄ect ground
transports in dense cities and metropolitan areas.
265.3 Robustness
The distinction of ￿rms into four di⁄erent categories according to their public
ownership share, although supported by the tests that accompany our estim-
ates, may seem somehow ad hoc. Thus, we aim at showing that our preferred
speci￿cation has been driven by a deep investigation of the relationship between
ownership and productivity in our sample. While in the ￿rst estimate we dis-
tinguished four categories of ￿rms, namely private ones, fully public ones, and
two types of mixed ￿rms, namely the "mainly public" ones (with a share of
public ownership abover 85%) and "truly" mixed ones, here we change this
speci￿cation as follows.
First, instead of using dummy variables, we consider the share of public
ownership as a continuous variable, and we include it among our regressors.
The results are reported in the ￿rst three columns of Table 12. We ￿nd that
the share of public ownership has always a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient,
thus suggesting that productivity is inversely related to the weight of public
shareholders. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls for the selection
mechanism (column (2)) and the city features (column (3)).
A second way to analyse the role of ownership is to reduce the number of
categories considered, grouping together all ￿rms where public shareholders have
a positive (but less than 100%) stake. The results reported in columns (4) to (6)
show that mixed ownership ￿rms are statistically di⁄erent from private ones,
being less productive, while the di⁄erence with fully public ones does not seem
to be signi￿cant. The latter result is driven by the heterogeneity within the
group of mixed ￿rms. This is the reason why in the main estimation above we
have chosen to distinguish in a speci￿c category ￿rms characterised by a large
presence of public ownership. However, the results on the di⁄erence between
mixed ￿rms and other types of ￿rms must be considered with some caution.
A second aspect of our estimate for which we want to test the robustness of
the evidence shown in the previous section refers to the relationship between the
￿xed e⁄ect of the ￿rst stage estimation and the ￿rms￿observable characteristics
chosen as explanatory variables in the second stage.
The aim is to provide some additional evidence in favour of the econometric
approach adopted: namely a ￿xed e⁄ect estimation in the ￿rst stage, as in
equation (1) plus an OLS estimator on the residuals of the ￿rst stage, as shown
in equation (2). Here we want to show that the inclusion of ￿xed e⁄ects in
the ￿rst stage is appropriate, as the control variables in the second stage are
27Table 12: The role of ownership
Total sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Metro -0.0753** -0.0492 -0.0883** -0.0907** -0.0630 -0.105**
(-2.073) (-1.292) (-2.150) (-2.297) (-1.559) (-2.408)
Metro services 0.290*** 0.299*** 0.266*** 0.306*** 0.323*** 0.289***
(2.897) (2.984) (2.793) (2.940) (3.124) (2.954)
Tram -0.216*** -0.255*** -0.211*** -0.236*** -0.279*** -0.226***
(-6.099) (-6.548) (-5.632) (-6.447) (-7.144) (-5.883)
Bus -0.147* -0.147* -0.235*** -0.124 -0.120 -0.207**
(-1.783) (-1.794) (-2.589) (-1.552) (-1.522) (-2.367)
Extra-urban services -0.0976*** -0.0719** -0.0422 -0.0569 -0.0248 -0.00162
(-2.857) (-2.047) (-1.088) (-1.631) (-0.693) (-0.0407)
Group member -0.0215 -0.0603 -0.0479 0.0336 -0.0138 -0.00177
(-0.377) (-1.087) (-0.877) (0.597) (-0.254) (-0.0326)
Competition 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.162*** 0.175***
(2.882) (2.871) (3.455) (3.479)
Public (share) -0.321*** -0.299*** -0.300***
(-8.619) (-8.972) (-8.754)
Mixed own. -0.297*** -0.299*** -0.314***
(-5.481) (-5.777) (-5.871)
Public -0.332*** -0.297*** -0.308***
(-6.771) (-6.865) (-6.767)
City population density 0.0351 0.0741*
(0.894) (1.748)
Observations 434 434 427 434 434 427










Prob > F (0.555) (0.201) (0.158)
Dependent variable: TFPit is the log of Total Factor Productivity, obtained as a residual from the
production function estimation. OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Standardized 'beta'
coefficients are reported. t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
signi￿cantly related to the estimated ￿xed e⁄ects. Indeed, as individual ￿xed
e⁄ects capture all unobserved ￿rm characteristics that are constant over time,
we expect them to be signi￿cantly correlated with the ￿rms￿ characteristics
considered in the second step.
In order to implement our robustness check, we ￿rst estimate a translog
production function with ￿xed e⁄ects, as in the ￿rst stage of our preferred
methodology. Then, we retrieve estimated ￿xed e⁄ects ￿i and we regress them
on the observed ￿rm characteristics employed in our econometric analysis, in
order to see whether such characteristics can really explain unobserved hetero-
geneity of ￿rms. Table 13 shows the results. Notice that the dependent variable
is no longer TFP but the individual ￿xed e⁄ect. We observe that competition
￿for the market￿is positively correlated with ￿rm￿ s ￿xed e⁄ects, while owner-
ship variables con￿rm the ranking in productivity: public owned ￿rms are the
28least productive, followed by mainly public ￿rms and mixed ownership ￿rms.14
Hence, the results obtained in section 5.2 may be regarded as robust.
Table 13: Firm ￿xed e⁄ects estimation
Total sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Metro -0.126*** -0.0842** -0.106*** -0.0758* -0.120***
(-3.446) (-2.211) (-2.657) (-1.858) (-2.662)
Metro services 0.267** 0.283*** 0.241** 0.257** 0.221**
(2.577) (2.727) (2.175) (2.344) (2.109)
Tram -0.301*** -0.350*** -0.248*** -0.295*** -0.244***
(-8.265) (-8.985) (-7.031) (-7.986) (-7.173)
Bus -0.114 -0.117 -0.159* -0.156* -0.258***
(-1.314) (-1.373) (-1.874) (-1.866) (-2.731)
Extra-urban services -0.0376 -0.00688 -0.0769** -0.0425 -0.00678
(-1.066) (-0.192) (-2.388) (-1.284) (-0.178)
Group member 0.101** 0.0346 0.0233 -0.0344 -0.0214
(2.134) (0.707) (0.477) (-0.705) (-0.462)
Competition 0.190*** 0.183*** 0.183***
(3.746) (3.845) (3.701)
Mixed own. -0.0182 -0.0133 -0.0286
(-0.470) (-0.375) (-0.783)
Mainly public mixed own. -0.189*** -0.204*** -0.221***
(-5.438) (-6.129) (-6.643)
Fully public own. -0.246*** -0.212*** -0.225***
(-4.420) (-4.207) (-4.717)
City population density 0.0196
(0.429)
Observations 434 434 434 434 427
R-squared 0.261 0.288 0.302 0.325 0.351
Test on equality between mixed







Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Test on equality between mixed







Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Test on equality between mainly








Prob > F (0.049) (0.002) (0.001)
Dependent variable: individual fixed effects, obtained from the production function estimation.
OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Standardized 'beta' coefficients are reported. t-statistics
in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
14Table 18 in the Appendix reports the results on the subsample of ground transportation
companies.
296 Conclusions
The cross country analysis carried out in the present paper has proved able
to shed light on the role that selection mechanisms and ownership have on
local public transport ￿rms in Europe. The main results can be summarized as
follows.
First of all, ￿rms selected through competition ￿for the market￿ present
higher levels of productivity. Secondly, we ￿nd that ownership matters: public
￿rms are generally less productive than private ￿rms. The same holds true for
mixed ownership ￿rms. However, we ￿nd that a large heterogeneity characterises
mixed ownership ￿rms, with mainly public ￿rms (those with a public share over
85%) less productive than other mixed ￿rms with a lower public share. Our third
testable hypothesis refers to the comparison between totally public and partially
public ￿rms. Although our results provide some support to the idea that partial
private participation to the shareholding is associated to higher productivity,
this ￿nding depends on the degree of private ownership and therefore on the
in￿ uence exerted on managerial choices by private shareholders is not robust
across speci￿cations. This result calls for further theoretical investigation on
the nature and performance of mixed ownership ￿rms.
Finally, we observe that available indicators of city characteristics rarely
a⁄ect local public transport ￿rms￿TFP, except for possible negative congestion
e⁄ects on ground transport services in large cities.
Caution is needed when drawing policy implications from our results. How-
ever, there is a mild indication that in the European countries under exam
competitive processes have been able to select more e¢ cient ￿rms than negoti-
ated procedures. This may well depend on the poor quality of the local bodies
in charge at negotiating the contracts, or on other causes which are beyond the
scope of the present analysis. Whatever the reason, policy proposals advocat-
ing a limitation of competitive procedures in this institutional context would
need to provide very strong evidence that negotiations yield better results. Any
proposal aimed at avoiding competitive pressures in this sector should bear the
burden of the proof.
As for ownership, the results above show no ambiguity: ￿rms in public
hands are less productive than private ones. However, the policy implications
are less clear cut, as they would depend on what explains our result. The
higher productivity of private ￿rms may have at least two drivers. The ￿rst
is that private shareholders simply have stronger incentives to make sure that
30the ￿rm is e¢ cient. The second one is that during the privatisation process
of the last few years more productive and pro￿table ￿rms have been sold to
private shareholders, so that only less productive ￿rms have now remained in
public hands. Understanding which explanation is preferable, would require
further analysis. However it is apparent that privatisation could be a solution
only if the power of incentives is the dominant driver of private ￿rms higher
productivity. Otherwise the path to e¢ ciency is far more complex. If one wants
to consider the privatisation option, our evidence indicates that mixed ￿rms are
still less e¢ cient than private ones, when the share in private hands is limited.
Hence, if privatisation is to be chosen, it seems preferable to go all the way (or
most of the way) to private ownership.
However, both competition and privatisation are no panacea: indeed, they
may have di⁄erent e⁄ects in di⁄erent set-ups, failing to deliver the expected
bene￿ts in some circumstances. In particular, although available data do not
include the contractual structure, it has to be highlighted that a careful con-
tractual design is crucial in providing the proper incentives to e¢ ciency, with
or without competitive tendering, with privately or publicly owned ￿rms.
Nonetheless, one should be aware that e¢ ciency is not the sole objective
of (national or local) policy makers. In particular, we have no data on service
quality, which is probably a very relevant and respectable goal of these ￿rms.
Finally, notice that other objectives, such as political patronage (as highlighted
by Lopez-de-Silanez, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) may well prevail. It could be
argued that the slow pace of reforms in LPT across Europe is due to an excess
of the perceived political costs of privatisation and pro-competitive policies over
the expected perceived political gains, accruing from better services and lower
costs and subsidies, which might ensue from such reforms. However, this is
matter for further research.
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More on the database




France Bordeaux; Lyon; Marseille; Nantes; Nice; Strasbourg; Toulouse
Germany Berlin; Bielefeld; Bochum; Bonn; Bremen; Dortmund; Dresden; Duisburg; Essen;
Frankfurt; Hamburg; Hannover; Koln; Leipzig; Mannheim; Munchen; Nurnberg;
Stuttgart
Italy Bari; Bologna; Firenze; Genova; Milano; Napoli; Palermo; Roma; Torino
Netherlands Amsterdam; The Hague
Portugal Lisboa
Spain Barcelona; Bilbao;  Las Palmas de Gran Canaria; Madrid; Malaga; Palma de
Mallorca; Sevilla; Valencia; Zaragoza
Sweden Goteborg; Stockholm
Table 15: Ownership typology by country
Austria Belgium Germany Italy Portugal Spain France Netherlands Sweden
N. of firms 2 1 23 14 5 19 7 2 4
Public 100.0 100.0 82.6 85.7 20.0 52.6 0.0 100.0 25.0
Mixed own. 0.0 0.0 17.4 14.3 20.0 10.5 71.4 0.0 0.0
Private 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.0 36.8 28.6 0.0 75.0
For each country are reported the percentages of firms characterized by alternative types of ownership.
Negotiated procedures Competition
36Table 16: Descriptive statistics according to the type of transport service
provided
Panel A: Underground transportation companies
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Capital 829,774.0 1,184,715.0 1,575.0 4,545,975.0
N. of employees 4,179.2 3,277.4 210.0 14,888.0
Cost of employees 183,102.4 169,181.5 3,910.0 843,456.0
Operating revenues 311,387.0 290,473.0 9,205.0 1,245,326.0
Value Added 289,843.3 273,425.0 7,560.0 1,187,732.0
Sales 207,602.0 175,234.7 8,972.0 717,946.0
K/L 247.8 531.2 2.9 4,082.4
VA/L 60.6 22.7 29.4 174.2
REVENUES/L 136.0 430.3 42.0 3,633.2
Unit lab. Cost 64.6 208.0 26.8 2,090.7
Panel B: Ground transportation companies
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Capital 111,109.6 147,698.1 1,249.0 782,852.0
N. of employees 1,964.3 2,193.3 95.0 12,786.0
Cost of employees 73,937.3 85,708.5 2,589.0 535,891.0
Operating revenues 124,745.7 156,389.7 7,838.0 948,124.0
Value Added 83,227.5 103,974.5 3,077.0 628,691.0
Sales 96,465.9 147,296.3 9,288.0 948,124.0
K/L 99.0 578.1 3.0 10,010.5
VA/L 100.4 743.6 24.6 12,222.3
REVENUES/L 192.5 1,161.2 39.3 18,217.3
Unit lab. Cost 38.8 9.3 25.2 122.1
Capital, total cost of employees, operating revenues, value added and sales are
expressed in thousand Euros. K/L is the ratio of capital over total number of
employess. VA/L is the ratio of value added over total number of employees.
REVENUE/L is operating revenues over total number of employees. Unit labour
cost is the ratio of total cost of employees over total number of employees. Mean
values over the period 1997-2006
Table 17: Descriptive statistics by Country
Austria Belgium Germany Italy Portugal Spain France Netherlands Sweden
N. of firms 2 1 23 14 5 19 7 2 4
N. of employees 1,457.7 5,845.9 2,321.5 2,818.7 2,178.0 1,605.0 1,671.1 6,259.1 2,530.8
Operating revenues 300,645.0 389,683.3 197,419.1 192,380.8 65,054.0 95,017.4 109,405.2 483,636.5 158,795.0
Sales 287,169.8 232,213.7 138,214.5 102,384.7 48,869.3 76,599.7 91,295.9 410,264.4 157,445.3
K/L 111.4 118.4 166.7 224.4 481.8 33.5 66.0 100.1 16.1
REVENUES/L 151.4 66.5 163.6 414.6 34.4 62.2 67.5 79.6 976.5
Unit lab. Cost 40.8 52.3 64.5 40.0 27.4 33.2 36.4 43.6 23.0
Negotiated procedures Competition
Operating revenues and sales are expressed in thousand Euros. K/L is the ratio of capital over total number of employees. REVENUE/L
is operating revenues over total number of employees. Unit labour cost is the ratio of total cost of employees over total number of
employees.
37Table 18: Firm e⁄ects estimation, ground transportation companies only
Ground transportation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tram -0.390*** -0.448*** -0.304*** -0.350*** -0.444***
(-8.624) (-9.708) (-7.326) (-8.020) (-10.08)
Bus 0.349*** 0.334*** 0.294*** 0.289*** 0.236***
(8.226) (7.774) (7.316) (7.052) (3.810)
Extra-urban services 0.0248 0.0545 -0.0590 -0.0291 0.0131
(0.554) (1.208) (-1.546) (-0.752) (0.347)
Group member 0.241*** 0.193*** 0.101** 0.0682* 0.0509*
(7.518) (6.543) (2.272) (1.742) (1.848)
Competition 0.204*** 0.166*** 0.139**
(2.947) (2.667) (2.431)
Mixed own. -0.0833** -0.0732** 0.0229
(-1.990) (-2.123) (0.744)
Mainly public mixed own. -0.379*** -0.389*** -0.432***
(-8.469) (-9.033) (-9.809)
Fully public own. -0.505*** -0.470*** -0.478***
(-9.662) (-10.79) (-10.70)
City population density -0.283***
(-6.152)
Observations 336 336 336 336 329
R-squared 0.336 0.370 0.507 0.528 0.574
Test on equality between mixed







Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Test on equality between mixed







Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Test on equality between mainly








Prob > F (0.138) (0.024) (0.002)
Dependent variable: individual fixed effects, obtained from the production function estimation.
OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Standardized 'beta' coefficients are reported. t-statistics









Number of workers employed in the company Amadeus database
Cost of
employees
Wage bill, as reported in the company's balance sheet Amadeus database
Operating
revenues
The sum of sales, stock variations and other operating revenues.
Data are reported in the company's balance sheet
Amadeus database
Value added Value added,  as reported in the company's balance sheet Amadeus database
Sales
Only revenues from sales, as reported in the company's balance
sheet
Amadeus database
K/L Ratio of capital over total number of employees Amadeus database
VA/L Ratio of value added over total number of employees Amadeus database
REVENUES/L Ratio of operating revenues over total number of employees Amadeus database
Unit labour cost Ratio of cost of employees over total number of employees Amadeus database
Public A dummy equal to 1 if the ownership is totally public Amadeus database and
Mixed
ownership




Private A dummy equal to 1 if the ownership is totally private Amadeus database and
Y
Index of output obtained as the ratio of sales over the monthly
ticket price for local public transport
Amadeus database for the sales.
Eurostat's Urban Audit database
and companies' web-sites for
the monthly ticket price
M




A dummy equal to 1 if the company offers metro transportation
and owns the assets
Companies' web-sites
Metro services
A dummy equal to 1 if the company offers metro transportation
and owns the assets
Companies' web-sites
Tram
A dummy equal to 1 if the company offers tramway
transportation
Companies' web-sites
Bus A dummy equal to 1 if the company offers bus transportation Companies' web-sites
Extra-urban
services




A dummy equal to 1 if the company is part of larger group
which provides transportation services in more than one city
Companies' web-sites
Competition
A dummy equal to 1 if the firm has been selected through
competitive tendering. The dummy is equal to 0 if the firm has




Number of inhabitants per square km, obtained as the ratio of
the number of city inhabitants over the city area expressed in
square km
Eurostat's Urban Audit database
City GDP per
capita
Average GDP per capita defined at city level Eurostat's Urban Audit database
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